The Nation
Everyone gains if Syria returns to the centre of the Arab world
Mohamad Bazzi, Edward R. Murrow Press Fellow
June 18. 2008
For decades, Syria has portrayed itself as the "beating heart of Arab nationalism" - the torchbearer of resistance and defiance to the West. That stance has often put Damascus at odds with other Arab regimes, especially those allied with the United States. But Syria managed to keep a central role in Arab politics.
After the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Bush administration turned its attention to Syria as another candidate for "regime change". The Syrian regime meddled in Iraq, nurtured Palestinian militants opposed to peace with Israel and dominated its smaller neighbour, Lebanon. For a country that is not rich in oil and has little economic clout, Syria derived its power from its strategic position in the Middle East. As the US sought to isolate Damascus, some Arab powers - especially Saudi Arabia - became hostile to the Syrian president, Bashar Assad, and his growing reliance on Iran. Syria was excluded from the Arab "fold".
But the balance of power in the region has shifted in recent months, and Arab governments are once again wooing Syria. Qatar and Egypt, in particular, want to end Syria's isolation and are working to improve Saudi-Syrian relations. Assad enhanced his position in the region by strongly backing Hizbollah in the Lebanese conflict and by agreeing to indirect talks with Israel through Turkish mediators.
Syria has played the role of a regional spoiler since 1970, when Hafez Assad rose to power in a military coup. He perfected the art of shifting alliances, stirring up trouble in neighbouring countries, and keeping his enemies mired in costly battles. When Assad died in June 2000, he was succeeded by his son, Bashar, a soft-spoken, British-educated ophthalmologist who had little experience in the hard-knuckled politics of the Middle East. While many dismissed the younger Assad as incapable of balancing his regional cards as masterfully as his father, Bashar has grown into the role of strongman over the past seven years.
After Saddam Hussein's removal, the Bush administration accused Syria of sheltering Iraqi Baathist leaders and allowing Islamic militants to slip into Iraq to fight US forces. In 2004, president George W Bush imposed economic sanctions against Damascus and tried to isolate it. That policy accelerated after the assassination of the former Lebanese prime minister, Rafik Hariri, in February 2005, in which top Syrian officials have been implicated by a United Nations investigation.
In response to America's cold shoulder, Assad's regime became more dependent on Iran (a partnership began in the early 1980s under the elder Assad), which helped shore up the Syrian economy with construction investments and cheap oil. Damascus also enhanced its alliances with Hamas, Hizbollah and the renegade Iraqi Shiite cleric Muqtada al Sadr. Assad knows the US cannot find a way out of Iraq without his help, but just to be safe, he keeps his connections to Hamas, Hizbollah and Sadr as potential bargaining chips that can shape events in the Palestinian territories, Lebanon and Iraq.
Assad's main goal is to preserve his Alawite minority regime that rules a Sunni-dominated country (the Alawites are an offshoot of Shiite Islam). But the holy grail for Assad - as for his father before him - is to regain control of the Golan Heights, a strategic terrain Israel occupied during the 1967 Six Day war.
Turkish mediators announced on Monday that Israeli and Syrian officials had completed two days of indirect talks, with another round set for July. Unlike the weak Palestinian leader, Mahmoud Abbas, Assad can actually deliver on a peace deal with Israel. Syria has consistently said that full peace is possible, but only if every inch of the Golan is returned. In January 2000, the then US president Bill Clinton led marathon talks between Hafez Assad and Ehud Barak, the then Israeli prime minister. Those discussions collapsed over a sliver of land, about 100 metres wide, that would have given Syria access to the Sea of Galilee, a major source of water for Israel.
Even without a regional settlement, Israel has much to gain from a deal over the Golan. It would mean not only a peace treaty with Syria, but an end of Syrian aid to what is now Israel's most dangerous enemy: Hizbollah, the Shiite militia that did surprisingly well in its war with a far superior Israeli army in the summer of 2006.
In addition to supporting renewed talks over the Golan, Washington must send its ambassador (who was recalled after the Hariri assassination) back to Damascus and resume high-level contact with Syrian officials. The Bush administration should also abandon its calls for a new government in Damascus.
Regime change is wishful thinking. Thanks to the Iraq war, Assad is now stronger than ever. Sadly, for Syrians worried about the carnage in Iraq, the Baathist dictatorship offers security, even as it arrests democracy activists and stifles the few freedoms Syrians still have.
By restarting dialogue, the US and Syria can find some common ground. For example, Syria favours a strong central government in Baghdad, while Iran does not. The Syrians are worried about the leakage that would be caused by a weak central state in Iraq. (Already, Syria is dealing with an influx of about 1.5 million Iraqi refugees, who are causing tremendous economic, social and security pressures.) That is one major area where Syrian and Iranian interests diverge - and the US and its Arab allies can take advantage of it.
The Syrian-Iranian alliance has endured for more than 25 years; it cannot be undone quickly. But the US and Arab regimes can begin to woo Syria away.
Mohamad Bazzi is the Edward R Murrow Press Fellow at the US Council on Foreign Relations and is an assistant professor of journalism at New York University.
Everyone gains if Syria returns to the centre of the Arab world
Mohamad Bazzi, Edward R. Murrow Press Fellow
June 18. 2008
For decades, Syria has portrayed itself as the "beating heart of Arab nationalism" - the torchbearer of resistance and defiance to the West. That stance has often put Damascus at odds with other Arab regimes, especially those allied with the United States. But Syria managed to keep a central role in Arab politics.
After the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Bush administration turned its attention to Syria as another candidate for "regime change". The Syrian regime meddled in Iraq, nurtured Palestinian militants opposed to peace with Israel and dominated its smaller neighbour, Lebanon. For a country that is not rich in oil and has little economic clout, Syria derived its power from its strategic position in the Middle East. As the US sought to isolate Damascus, some Arab powers - especially Saudi Arabia - became hostile to the Syrian president, Bashar Assad, and his growing reliance on Iran. Syria was excluded from the Arab "fold".
But the balance of power in the region has shifted in recent months, and Arab governments are once again wooing Syria. Qatar and Egypt, in particular, want to end Syria's isolation and are working to improve Saudi-Syrian relations. Assad enhanced his position in the region by strongly backing Hizbollah in the Lebanese conflict and by agreeing to indirect talks with Israel through Turkish mediators.
Syria has played the role of a regional spoiler since 1970, when Hafez Assad rose to power in a military coup. He perfected the art of shifting alliances, stirring up trouble in neighbouring countries, and keeping his enemies mired in costly battles. When Assad died in June 2000, he was succeeded by his son, Bashar, a soft-spoken, British-educated ophthalmologist who had little experience in the hard-knuckled politics of the Middle East. While many dismissed the younger Assad as incapable of balancing his regional cards as masterfully as his father, Bashar has grown into the role of strongman over the past seven years.
After Saddam Hussein's removal, the Bush administration accused Syria of sheltering Iraqi Baathist leaders and allowing Islamic militants to slip into Iraq to fight US forces. In 2004, president George W Bush imposed economic sanctions against Damascus and tried to isolate it. That policy accelerated after the assassination of the former Lebanese prime minister, Rafik Hariri, in February 2005, in which top Syrian officials have been implicated by a United Nations investigation.
In response to America's cold shoulder, Assad's regime became more dependent on Iran (a partnership began in the early 1980s under the elder Assad), which helped shore up the Syrian economy with construction investments and cheap oil. Damascus also enhanced its alliances with Hamas, Hizbollah and the renegade Iraqi Shiite cleric Muqtada al Sadr. Assad knows the US cannot find a way out of Iraq without his help, but just to be safe, he keeps his connections to Hamas, Hizbollah and Sadr as potential bargaining chips that can shape events in the Palestinian territories, Lebanon and Iraq.
Assad's main goal is to preserve his Alawite minority regime that rules a Sunni-dominated country (the Alawites are an offshoot of Shiite Islam). But the holy grail for Assad - as for his father before him - is to regain control of the Golan Heights, a strategic terrain Israel occupied during the 1967 Six Day war.
Turkish mediators announced on Monday that Israeli and Syrian officials had completed two days of indirect talks, with another round set for July. Unlike the weak Palestinian leader, Mahmoud Abbas, Assad can actually deliver on a peace deal with Israel. Syria has consistently said that full peace is possible, but only if every inch of the Golan is returned. In January 2000, the then US president Bill Clinton led marathon talks between Hafez Assad and Ehud Barak, the then Israeli prime minister. Those discussions collapsed over a sliver of land, about 100 metres wide, that would have given Syria access to the Sea of Galilee, a major source of water for Israel.
Even without a regional settlement, Israel has much to gain from a deal over the Golan. It would mean not only a peace treaty with Syria, but an end of Syrian aid to what is now Israel's most dangerous enemy: Hizbollah, the Shiite militia that did surprisingly well in its war with a far superior Israeli army in the summer of 2006.
In addition to supporting renewed talks over the Golan, Washington must send its ambassador (who was recalled after the Hariri assassination) back to Damascus and resume high-level contact with Syrian officials. The Bush administration should also abandon its calls for a new government in Damascus.
Regime change is wishful thinking. Thanks to the Iraq war, Assad is now stronger than ever. Sadly, for Syrians worried about the carnage in Iraq, the Baathist dictatorship offers security, even as it arrests democracy activists and stifles the few freedoms Syrians still have.
By restarting dialogue, the US and Syria can find some common ground. For example, Syria favours a strong central government in Baghdad, while Iran does not. The Syrians are worried about the leakage that would be caused by a weak central state in Iraq. (Already, Syria is dealing with an influx of about 1.5 million Iraqi refugees, who are causing tremendous economic, social and security pressures.) That is one major area where Syrian and Iranian interests diverge - and the US and its Arab allies can take advantage of it.
The Syrian-Iranian alliance has endured for more than 25 years; it cannot be undone quickly. But the US and Arab regimes can begin to woo Syria away.
Mohamad Bazzi is the Edward R Murrow Press Fellow at the US Council on Foreign Relations and is an assistant professor of journalism at New York University.
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